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From 1980 to 1993, the number of inmates in state and 
federal prisons tripled. Throughout this expansion, the poorly-
educated continued to be overrepresented among the nation's 
prisoners. While there is renewed interest in training programs 
for displaced workers, welfare recipients, and school dropouts, 
the criminal justice community still reverberates the "nothing 
works" judgment about rehabilitation from the 1970's. (See 
Martinson (1974).) While rapidly expanding prison populations 
have led to the development of "alternative sanctions" to divert 
inmates to less expensive modes of supervision, basic education 
is being overlooked as a promising training program to reduce 
prison populations. 
The economic theory of criminal behavior provides some 
predictions about the relationship between education and 
criminality. Becker's (1968) model of maximizing utility by 
choosing between legal and illegal activities was extended by 
Ehrlich (1975) to explicitly consider education. In Ehrlich's 
model, education affects the incentive to participate in illegal 
activity to the extent that it affects the relative opportunities 
available to potential offenders. If the returns to education are 
higher in legitimate activities, an increase in education increases 
the direct payoff to legal-sector activities and increases the 
opportunity cost of incarceration, thereby reducing the incentive 
to commit crime. However, the value of education as a crime 
prevention program must ultimately be settled empirically. I 
The first two chapters of this dissertation offer several 
pieces of evidence on the relationship between criminal behavior 
and education received both inside and outside prison.2 The 
analysis in chapter one utilizes a new data set from the Wisconsin 
Department of Corrections covering all commitments to the state 
prison system over the 1980's. In that data set, higher 
IRecent research on individual criminal behavior has focused on 
young men, as they are responsible for the majority of criminal 
acts. While no recent econometric studies of crime have 
education as their primary focus, several include education as part 
of the analysis. Freeman (1992) documents the involvement of 
disadvantaged young men in illegal activities, which is 
particularly pronounced among those with the lowest educational 
attainment. Grogger (1994) includes education in his structural 
model of legal and illegal labor supply, concluding that education 
matters in criminality only to the extent that it affects wages. 
Viscusi (1986) fmds that participation in crime is not statistically 
significantly related to years of education but is strongly related 
to enrollment status in a sample of young black males in three 
cities. The literature on rehabilitation of convicted offenders is 
mixed, often does not provide much discussion of possible 
selection effects, and often considers counseling rather than 
educational programs. 
2Note that educational programs are common in prison systems. 
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educational achievement3 is associated with lower recidivism 
rates. 4 In addition, people are learning in these prison-based 
programs. Men who appear in the Wisconsin data more than 
once were substantially better educated when they arrived for 
their second prison term than they had been the first time they 
were observed. They gain 1.3 years of schooling and 0.6 grade 
levels of tested achievement over an average of four years 
between admissions. It is likely that these gains are the result of 
the broad array of prison education offerings. Ehrlich I s theory 
3 Achievement is measured by an adult basic education 
standardized test administered to all inmates upon entry to the 
state prison system. 
4In the analysis of future criminal activity, both the probability 
of recidivism and the time to recidivism are of substantive 
interest. Specifically, the expected costs of future incarceration 
for a newly-released group of prisoners depends on the 
probability they return to prison. A small reduction in that 
likelihood could result in substantial savings, as the average term 
served is about 17 months. The recidivism savings also have a 
"multiplier" effect, as that individual who does not return to 
prison not only does not serve a second term, but does not return 
for a third term either. The differential effects of any variable on 
the probability of recidivism and the length of time until return 
may help in understanding the determinants of recidivism. In this 
dissertation, accelerated failure-time models are used where right 
censoring of the data is substantial. In other settings, the 
probability of failure and the time to failure (conditional upon 
failure) are estimated separately. 
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would predict that those who returned gained less from the 
education programs, on average, than those who did not return. 
The focus of chapter one is an evaluation of the impact on 
recidivism of completing an adult basic or high school education 
program while in prison. I find that education in prison is 
associated with statistically significant reductions in the 
probability of recidivism and significant increases in the time until 
recidivism. Since only inmates in Wisconsin prisons late in the 
decade have indicators of participation in prison education 
programs included in the data, here I analyze a subsample of the 
administrative data. In this subsample, 39 percent were returned 
to prison within four years of release. However, those inmates 
who completed education program were nine percentage points 
less likely to be reincarcerated over that period. Thus, not only 
do those who enter prison with higher educational attainment have 
lower recidivism rates, but it appears possible to reduce 
recidivism by providing education in prison. 
One is always concerned about endogenous determination 
of a variable of interest, particularly in program evaluation, and 
it is these concerns that motivate much of chapter one. 
Specifically, it is possible that inmates do not learn anything 
useful in prison education classes and completing a program 
merely indicates something about the motivation of the inmate. 
In that case, it would be wrong to attribute the lower recidivism 
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rates to the program, since all the program does is sort the 
offenders by their level of interest in the program, which happens 
to be correlated with the probability of returning to prison. 
I employ two primary methods to address possible 
selection bias. First, I explore the impact of adding covariates to 
explain recidivism. Here, I benefit from the rich set of controls 
available in the administrative data, including indicators of 
offense type, prior criminality, security classification, and test 
score. These controls should be good proxies for inmate 
heterogeneity, yet none of these attenuate the effect of education 
programs on recidivism. 
In the second approach to accounting for possible 
selection bias, I develop a flexible hazard model which allows for 
the possibility that the unobservables influencing recidivism are 
correlated with those influencing selection into the education 
programs. This estimation strategy accommodates endogenous 
selection into the education program without requiring 
assumptions on the form of the baseline hazard (as in a parametric 
tobit model). In addition, this approach does not rely on 
exclusion restrictions to identify the selection effect. 
There are two equations in this maximum likelihood 
model of discrete choice. The flexible hazard equation, 
(1) 
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specifies the conditional probability of recidivism in period K 
given it hasn't occurred before K as a function of educational 
program status E; a set of regressors X, including age at 
admission, race, test score, prior educational attainment, whether 
or not the inmate had served other terms in prison, and sentence 
length; and an unobserved random variable 6H uncorrelated with 
E and X. The baseline hazard parameter, IX, takes on a different 
value in each period. The parameter of interest here is y, which 
measures the impact of completing an educational program in 
prison on the conditional recidivism hazard. 
To account for potential endogeneity of the educational 
program status dummy, a second equation is included: 
peE = 1 I X) = 1 -eXP(-eXP(I3~X) 6.) , (2) 
where 6s is an unobserved random variable uncorrelated with X. 
Correlation between 6H and 6s is allowed, however, and this 
correlation is where the selection behavior is captured . 
. Heterogeneity in this model can be specified as a number of 
"types" of individuals, with each type described by a distinct 
pairing (6H ,6s). The estimation identifies clusterings of 
unobserved components of individual behavior, interpreted as 
"types" of actors. 
In estimates of the selection equation, the important 
determinants of whether an inmate completes an education 
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program are test score (measured upon entry to prison), whether 
he has already graduated from high school, whether he has served 
time in prison before, the sentence length and sentence status. 5 
Inmates who have served time in the past are less likely to 
complete a program in the current term. This result is likely the 
sum of two effects operating in the same direction. First, inmates 
who have squandered an opportunity in the past are less likely to 
be recommended to a program. Second, inmates who had the 
opportunity for prison education in the past and who "failed" on 
the outside are less likely to succeed if given access to an 
education program a second time. Note that the latter effect 
serves as a control for inmate heterogeneity. Inmates with longer 
sentences are more likely to complete programs, which makes 
sense since programs may take several months to complete. 
In the hazard equation, the coefficient on educational 
program completion is negative and significant, meaning that 
those who complete programs are less likely to return to prison. 
The pattern of sign and significance of the coefficients is similar 
to those of the earlier models. Conditional on the other included 
co variates , those who have served time in the past and those 
5Based on personal observation and interviews at Dodge 
Correctional Institution in the spring of 1992, these are exactly 
the factors that the Assessment and Evaluation committee used in 
determining assignments to prison education programs. 
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released from higher-security facilities have statistically 
significantly higher hazard rates. 
In sum, selection bias does not seem to be-driving the 
fmding that inmates who complete education programs have lower 
rates of recidivism: the semiparametric flexible hazard 
formulation to allow for heterogeneity yields estimates similar to 
those from probits and tobits which do not control for endogenous 
selection. The richness of the data and the structure of 
educational assignment seem to account for the usual endogeneity 
concerns. 
The final piece of evidence on the relationship between 
criminality and education comes from the analysis of a sample of 
non-incarcerated young men in chapter two. The Boston Youth 
Survey (BYS) interviewed youths 17-24 years old in low income 
areas of Boston in 1989 about a wide range of socioeconomic 
topics. In the BYS, I find that more schooling is associated with 
lower probabilities of committing illegal activities and, for those 
who report involvement in criminal activity, more schooling is 
associated with lower conviction rates. In this sample, 23 percent 
have committed crime in the past year. An additional year of 
education is associated with a 2.8 percentage point decrease in the 
predicted probability of committing crime. Among those who 
have committed crime, 32 percent have been convicted. An 
additional year of education is associated with a 6.2 point drop in 
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that predicted probability. In contrast to the strong effect of 
education, other background characteristics do not predict 
conviction. 
If those individuals with the greatest likelihood of 
detection desist from illegal activity, the errors in the crime 
equation and the conviction equation will be negatively 
correlated, leading to attenuation bias in the estimated coefficients 
on education. To account for this, I propose and estimate a 
simultaneous model, fmding no significant correlation between the 
errors in the two equations. Education remains a strongly 
significant (negative) predictor of criminality while the statistical 
significance of education as a covariate of conviction drops below 
conventional levels . The results in chapter two imply that while 
the over-representation in prison of those with low educational 
attainment may result from both a higher probability of 
committing crime and a higher probability of conviction, the 
former effect is more important. The conviction effect is both 
smaller quantitatively and fragile to specification. 
Together, the first two chapters of the dissertation 
complement existing evidence that there are high social returns to 
educating people with limited access to education. For young 
men in the central city, more education is associated with lower 
levels of criminal behavior and, for those who are not diverted, 
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education in prison reduces recidivism. 6 While one should be 
cautious in interpreting results from very different samples of the 
population,7 the results of chapter two suggest that the effect of 
education is to reduce criminality, not to make criminals 
"smarter" (e.g., better at avoiding detection). 
The estimated reduction in recidivism due to prison 
education programs represents substantial social savings. These 
can accrue from lower corrections expenditures, fewer crimes, 
lower security costs, lower levels of crime, and higher 
employment of releasees. Although the results of this research 
suggest that states should be expanding their education programs 
in correctional facilities, Corrections Compendium reports that 
many states have cut their budgets for prison education in the past 
five years, even as prison populations increased rapidly (Lillis, 
(1994». 
While the implications of this research for criminal justice 
policy are clear, that training programs in prisons should be 
expanded, the implications for employment policy are less direct. 
6 Across data sources and specifications, white men gain more 
from education than do blacks. This is consistent with the fmding 
of Viscusi (1986). 
7That is, the experience of convicted offenders in Wisconsin 
may be different from the population of disadvantaged youth in 
Boston. 
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One implication is that consideration of criminal justice outcomes 
will tilt the balance in favor of general training and employment 
programs. 8 The economic model motivating this research 
suggests that the recidivism reductions come from employment 
effects. Further research is necessary to establish evidence for 
that link: and to determine the extent to which increasing earnings 
inequality in the legal sector contributes to participation in illegal 
activities. It is possible that other types of employment policies, 
in addition to traditional training, could have large impacts on 
crime rates and criminal justice expenditure. 
In chapter three, the dissertation turns to another subject 
relevant to current criminal justice policy debates: immigration. 
This issue has figured prominently in gubernatorial races, most 
notably California, and in suits by several states to recoup, from 
the federal government, public expenditures on immigrants. 
Though there is much hyperbole as to whether immigration 
increases the crime rate, there is no credible empirical evidence. 
This chapter, written jointly with Kristin Butcher, fills this gap. 
8The evaluations of the Job Corps program provide an example 
of the potential importance of crime reductions as a benefit of 
training programs. (See Levitan and Gallo (1988), Long et al. 
(1981), and MaHar et al. (1982).) Donohue and Siegelman (1995, 
p. 61) report that 40 percent of the social benefits of the Job 
Corps program came from reduced crime. 
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Rather than joining the debate about public expenditures, 
chapter three investigates two of the possible avenues through 
which immigrants might affect the criminal justice system: 
immigrants may be more likely to commit crimes than natives 
and/or immigrants may have an adverse impact on crime by 
crowding natives out of the legal sector and into the illegal sector. 
These effects both imply that crime rates would be higher in areas 
with heavy immigrant concentrations, ceteris paribus. We exploit 
the fact that immigration is a geographically concentrated 
phenomenon and use data from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) and the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) to compare the 
levels of crime in immigrant intensive cities to the levels of crime 
in other cities over the period 1980-1990.9 We find that cities 
with large numbers of immigrants tend to have high crime rates 
in the cross-section, but there is no evidence that areas with high 
levels of immigration have experienced disproportionate growth 
in criminal activity over the last decade. Therefore, either 
immigrants are no more likely to commit crimes and do not 
crowd natives into crime or these two effects are offsetting. 
There are several alternative explanations for this 
estimated zero effect, which we examine in turn. The first 
90ur research strategy is similar to that used by others to analyze 
the effect of immigration on the employment and wages of the 
native-born. 
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interpretation, that demographic changes are not reflected in city 
crime rates, may not be surprising given the consensus in the 
crime literature that it is very difficult to explain levels of crime. 
A second explanation is that immigration, other migration, legal 
labor market activity, and criminal activity are simultaneously 
determined.lO Following Altonji and Card (1991), we control for 
potential correlations between immigrant inflows and local 
economic conditions by using an instrumental variables 
procedure, using the initial fraction foreign-born as a predictor of 
immigrant inflows over the decade. The instrumental variables 
procedure does not change our estimate that increases in 
immigration have no impact on growth in crime rates. These 
results suggest that simultaneity is not responsible for the zero 
coefficient on immigration in the first differences. 
The third explanation for our results is that our data are 
simply too noisy. In particular, the fraction of the population 
comprised by new immigrants may be too small in most cities to 
be accurately sampled by the CPS. To investigate this hypothesis, 
we analyze the fraction of the population that is Hispanic rather 
IOEvidence on this issue is mixed. For example, Filer (1992) 
reports that immigration into a city increases native outflows and 
reduces the number of natives moving in. In contrast, Butcher 
and Card (1991) report that except for the three most immigrant 
intensive cities (Miami, Los Angeles, New York), immigrants and 
natives appear to be moving to the same cities during the 1980's. 
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than the fraction of new immigrants since the two are highly 
correlated and the former should be measured with less error. 
We fmd that although some cities show a dramatic increase in the 
fraction of the population that is Hispanic, these cities do not 
experience higher than average increases in crime over the 
decade. A second potential source of measurement error comes 
from changes in definitions of metropolitan areas and central 
cities during the 1980's. In order to test for this problem, we re-
ran our regressions using only data from after 1983. Changing 
the sample in this way does not change the estimated zero impact 
of fraction recent immigrant on changes in the crime rate. 
A fmal source of misspecification may be that we do not 
have the timing right; perhaps it takes a certain amount of time 
for an immigrant to either assimilate into the legal labor market 
or enter the criminal sector. Our measure of recent immigrant, 
capturing only those who immigrated in the past year, would not 
pick up these effects. We attempt to address this in several ways: 
by looking at the change in crime rate over the 10 year period, 
and by allowing one, two and three year lags of fraction recent 
immigrant to enter regressions. None of these specification 
checks alter inference. 
Since the direct and indirect effects of immigration cannot 
be separately identified in the city-level analysis, we also use data 
on individuals from the 1980 National Longitudinal Survey of 
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Youth (NLSY) to see whether immigrants are more likely to 
report having committed criminal acts than natives. In the 
individual data, immigrants are significantly less likely to commit 
crime whether or not one controls for other demographic 
characteristics. 
The findings from the metropolitan area analysis are 
consistent with the literature on immigration I s effect on local 
labor markets, which finds little or no adverse effect of 
immigration on the wages of natives. They are also consistent 
with the crime literature, which has been quite unsuccessful at 
explaining variation in crime rates across cities. (See Land, 
McCall and Cohen (1990) for a review.) Given the absence of 
any relationship between immigration rates and changes in crime 
rates, we conclude that it is inappropriate, as well as pointless, to 
use immigration policy to achieve criminal justice goals. We fmd 
no support for the idea that cities receiving large immigrant 
inflows require a different employment policy than do cities 
receiving large inflows of native migrants. 
The evidence reported in this dissertation provides strong 
testimony about several aspects of criminal justice policy and 
highly suggestive testimony about employment policy. Moving 
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